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Survey and recommendations
Other than candidates' self restraint,
judicial campaign oversight committees
serve as the only barrier against the
"Barbarians at the Gate"
by WILLIAM FORTUNE and PENNY J.WHITE

"Nine years ago a viscious thug stabbed
oung
mother withStevie
photohad
of child.
"He and repeatedly raped a pregnant
was adorable.
just turned
woman leaving her and her unborn child
three when he was beaten and murto die. Renaldo Adams was sentenced
dered. The Andrews decision let him go
to die. But now, thanks to Justice Drayton
free after serving just a third of his senNabors, Adams is off death row."
tence. If Justice Alexander hadn't voted
Alabama 2006 primary - Tom Parker ad.
for that decision this wouldn't have happened."
"Learn more about Tom Parker and his
Washington 2006 - John Greon ad.
ties to liberal trial lawyers."
"Louis Butler worked to put criminals back Alabama 2006 primary - Drayton Nabors ad.
on the street. Like Ruben Mitchell who
raped an 1 1-year-old girl with a learning "Why has Sue Bell Cobb attacked Drayton Nabors? Sue Bell Cobb has taken
disability. Butler found a loophole.
money from liberal trial lawyers. And
Mitchell went on to molest another child.
who does she support? John Kerry."
Can Wisconsin families feel safe with
Alabama 2006 general - Drayton Nabors ad.
Louis Butler on the Supreme Court?"
Wisconsin 2008 - Mike Gableman ad.
Small child with teddy bear saying
"Michael Gableman's ads are scaring
me. Call Michael Gableman and tell him
to stop scaring me and other kids."

These statements, and many similar ones, made by
incumbents and challengers, are becoming common in
state judicial elections. Though arguably distasteful and
inconsistent with the role of a neutral, independentjudicial officer, they are not prohibited. After the decision in

Wisconsin 2008 - Louis Butler ad.

are likely not even unethical. They are instead protected
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Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,' these statements
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by the First Amendment and as such
beyond governmental restriction.
In White the Supreme Court struck
down an ethics provision that prohibited candidates for judicial office
from "announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues." In
its aftermath, lower courts, judicial
ethics bodies, and state supreme
courts have eliminated restrictions
on judicial speech and conduct
beyond what the White decision
required. The result has been the
onset of a new environment in judicial campaigns, an environment that
is often beset with negative advertising, contentious campaigns, and
undignified behavior.
The post-White climate not only
allows, but arguably encourages,
judicial candidates to go for the
jugular, prompting campaign statements that come strikingly close to
predicting future rulings as well as
those that unfairly, and sometimes
untruthfully, criticize an opponent s
character. But while the High
Court's decision took away the power
of the government to curtail judicial
speech that is rancorous and
unseemly, the decision did not tie
the hands of those who wish to promote more honorable judicial campaigns. In his concurring opinion,
1.536 U.S. 765 (2002).
2. Id. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
3. David B. Rottman, Conduct and Its Oversight
in JudicialElections: Can Friendly Pe.rsuasion Outperform the Powe- toRegulate?, 21 GEORGTOWN J. IEGAL
ETncs _
(issue 4)(2008) (citing Roy A.
Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing:Are
StateJudges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes of American
Democracy, 2J.L. & Pot. 57, 93 n.92 (1985)).
4. Id. at 110-11.
5. Terry Carter, Boosting the Bench, 88 A.B.A.J.
29-32 (2002). The U.S. Chamber put $10 million
into the 2000 judicial races in Alabama, Mississippi, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois, and was gearing up for a similar effort in 2002.
6. Rottman, supra n. 3.
7. National Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on
Judicial Campaign Conduct, EFFECTIVF JUDLCIAL
CAMPAIGN

CONDUCT

COMMITTEES:

A How-To

HANDBOOK, at iii (National Center for State
Courts, 2004).
8. American Bar Association, EnsuringJudicial
independence in the 21st Century:judicial (ampaign Conduct Committees, at ws.abanet.org/
judind/resourcekit/conductcomm.h tin l, 2007.

Justice Kennedy offered this advice
to those who desire to advance the
interests of judicious campaigning
and improve the conduct of candidates for judicial office:

If Minnesota believes that certain sorts of candidate speech
disclose flaws in the candidate's credentials, democracy
and free speech are their own
correctives. The legal profession, the legal academy, the
press, voluntary groups, political and civic leaders, and all
interested citizens can use their
own First Amendment freedoms to protest statements
inconsistent with standards of
judicial neutrality and judicial
excellence. Indeed, if democracy is to fulfill its promise, they
must do so. They must reach
voters who are uninterested or
uninformed or blinded by partisanship, and they must urge
upon the voters a higher and
better understanding of the
judicial function and a stronger
commitment to preserving its
finest traditions.
Judicial campaign oversight committees provide one means by which
democracy seeks to fulfill its promise
of assuring a fair and impartial judiciary. Described by some as a "countermeasure"3 to White,judicial campaign
oversight committees are not totally
an advent of White. In the late 1970s, a
rash of aberrational conduct by judicial candidates in California led to the
creation of committees whose purpose would be to oversee and address
inappropriate conduct during judicial campaigns.
These early campaign oversight
committees served in an advisory
capacity, hearing complaints about

unfair or untruthful advertising and
encouraging ethical campaigning.
Within a few years, the need for such
oversight spread to other states
where the war for the bench was
being waged between plaintiffs' tort
lawyers and business interests. In
many states, the raucous tenor of
judicial elections demanded that a
forum be created where unfair
advertising by the candidates could
be challenged and addressed.4
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce's
efforts to elect pro-business judges'
coincided with the Supreme Court's
decision in White. The coalescence
opened the door-at least halfwayfor unbridled campaigning in judicial races. With judicial candidates
free from traditional restraints, judicial campaign oversight committees
are "one countermeasure currently
being tested" to assure that judicial
elections are distinguishable from
raw, political, contests influenced by
special interests and campaign contributions.'
In addition to addressing issues in
current judicial elections, some
argue that judicial campaign oversight committees will establish, over
time, an acceptable across-the-board
"culture and climate" for judicial
elections.' The result would be the
preservation of a respected and independent judiciary; to achieve such a
highly desirable result the American
Bar Association encourages the creation of judicial campaign oversight
committees.'
What exactly is a judicial campaign oversight committee? And
how might it curb abuses in judicial
campaigns that undermine the independence of and the public's support for the American judiciary?
The judicial campaign oversight committee serves three primary functions:
educating candidates at the beginning
of the campaign about relevant judicial
canons and campaign finance regulations; reviewing campaign materials in
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advance and answering candidates'
questions about campaign communications or tactics; and, as a last resort,
publicly disclosing any instances of misconduct or referring complaints to the
official judicial discipline entity.'

By performing these three functions, committees provide a mechanism by which judicial campaigns
may be advised, monitored, and, at
least informally, regulated)
The survey
In 2006, a handful of judicial campaign oversight committees in states
with judicial elections undertook to
educate and inform judicial candidates early in the election cycle. In
addition, several received and
responded to complaints regarding
judicial campaigns. Based on information contained in reports to the
National Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Judicial Campaign Oversight,
we surveyed, by email and/or phone,
representatives of those committees
that reported handling complaints
in the 2006 election cycle; the purpose was to gather information that
might be of use to campaign oversight committees in 2008 and future
years."
We received information from the
following committees that dealt with
complaints in the 2006 election
cycle: Alabama, Florida (Dade
County), Illinois (state); Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota
(Hennepin County); New York (Erie
County), New Mexico, Nevada, Ohio
(Columbus Bar Association), and
South Dakota. In addition, we
received information from two committees that did not report complaints in 2006 but that had dealt
with complaints in prior cycles: Illinois (Cook County), and Washington (King County).
Committees are either "official" or
"unofficial." An official committee is
created by the state, usually by the
state supreme court, and is authorized to discipline judicial candidates
who violate the canons of judicial
ethics. Louisiana is an example of a
state with an official committee.
Although some unofficial committees have state connection (in the
234

nature of financial support or member appointment) they do not discharge a state function and are
therefore not considered state
12
actors.
Most of the committees surveyed
are unofficial. There is a "tilt toward
unofficial committees""3 because
unofficial committees are free to
"protest statements inconsistent
with standards of judicial neutrality
and judicial excellence,"" even if
the statements are protected by the
First Amendment. An official cominittee, on the other hand, speaks
for the state and therefore must
refrain from criticizing candidate
statements that are protected by the
First Amendment, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White.

Survey responses
1) Source of complaints.
Most complaints come from candidates, though all committees consider citizen complaints as well. Most
committees are receptive to complaints against outside interest
groups, but no committee reported
responding to such activity in the
2006 election cycle. Most committees
would act on a complaint by a committee member. Most do not actively
solicit complaints from citizens,
although Kentucky did so in 2006
through distribution of a brochure
and by public speaking. Some committees publicize their role to groups
of lawyers, and all committees communicate with judicial candidates,
advising them of the committee's
role and providing the candidates
with the committee's operating procedures.
2) Campaign agreements.
Most committees ask candidates to
sign a campaign agreement (sometimes called a pledge or an affirmation). By web site posting or press
release, or both, committees favorably publicize candidates who sign
the agreement.
3) Agreements between candidates.
At least two committees (Alabama
and Illinois (state)) invite candidates
in a particular race (and their staffs)
to a joint meeting to review proce-
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dures and to sign an agreement to
campaign in an ethical and dignified
manner. This procedure is feasible if
the committee's oversight is limited
to a small number of races at any one
time.
4) Receipt of complaints.

Committees report various ways in
which complaints are received. A
complaint form (available on the
website) is useful. All committees
require that complaints be in writing
and some require that the complaint
be signed. No responding committees require that complaints be sworn.
Some committees allow complaints to
be filed by email, but others require
them to be mailed, faxed, or handdelivered. One committee accepts
emails but requires a follow-up signed
complaint. One committee has special rules for processing anonymous
complaints, while another states that
anonymous complaints will not be
considered.
5) Screening of complaints.

Several respondents said that committees need to authorize a person
(or persons), perhaps the committee
chair, to dismiss complaints that are
frivolous or address matters outside
the committee's jurisdiction.
6) Jurisdiction.

Committees established by or in
conjunction with county bar associations exercise jurisdiction over races
within their counties. State-wide

9. Id.
10. Beyond the scope of this paper is a discussion
of the achantages and disadvantages of "official" or
state-sponsored and "unofficial" or volunteer committees. David Rottman discusses the differences in
his article, supro n. 3, and concludes that "[o]n balance, the world of judicial elections now favors the
unofficial oversight committees that rely entirely
on the reputations of their members, who include
dierse community leaders." The authors of this
article agree with Mr. Rottman's conclusions. See
discussion of official and unofficial committees in
text inf s.

11. The survey instrument is available from the
authors. Some of the committee representatives
were interviewed by phone; the questions and
responses generally followed the questions in the
email survey.
12. Rottman, supra n. 3.
13. Id.
14. 536 U.S. 765, 795 (2002) (Justice Kennedy
concurring). See also the concuriing opinion of
Justice Souter in New York State Board of Elections v. on-es, 128 S.Ct. 791, 803 (2008). 'Judicial
elections, if flair and open, could be an essential
forum for society to discuss and define the attributes of judicial excellence and to find ways to discern those qualities in the candidates.'

committees might limit jurisdiction
to certain races; for example the Illinois state committee exercises jurisdiction only over supreme court and
court of appeals races. Most committees purport to be receptive to all
types of complaints about unfair
campaigning. However, Illinois
(state) and Columbus, Ohio, limit
jurisdiction to advertising (broadly
defined).
7) Types of complaints.

It appears that most complaints
are about alleged factual misrepresentations in campaign literature,
websites, etc. Committees have not
experienced a rush of complaints
about candidates appearing to promise results. In 2006 (and 2007) the
Kentucky committee considered
such complaints and took action
against candidates who appeared to
be suggesting that they would decide
cases on inappropriate grounds-in
2007 the candidates' literature advertised that they were "pro-life" and
favored "faith based solutions."
8) Investigation.

The issue of how to conduct an
investigation is clearly a problem if
the underlying facts are in dispute.
Few committees have investigators on
staff; thus the task of investigating
falls on committee members. In Kentucky and Maryland the chair
appoints a subcommittee to investigate and report; other committees
apparently investigate or not depending on the circumstances. Dade
County (Florida) says that it does not
investigate and Columbus, Ohio, says
it does not attempt to verify facts in
ads. It may be impossible to investigate complaints arising late in the
election cycle-one committee said it
reached the merits of the controversy
after the election was over.
9) Confidentiality.

Some committees (Erie County,
New York, for example) require that
the parties keep the matter confidential until and unless the committee
allows the matter to be publicized.
10) Decision making.
When, as is often the case, members
live in different cities, the committee
acts through conference calls and
email exchanges. When the members

are more localized, for example, when
the committee is a county- wide bar
committee, such as Erie County, the
committee meets in person. An example of decision making by a state committee is Kentucky. In Kentucky, a
report by the subcommittee is sent to
the full committee with the subcommittee (or the executive committee)
empowered to act if it is impracticable
for the full committee to deal with the
matter. Columbus, Ohio, obligates its
members to be available every morning the week before an election; they
are advised each afternoon whether to
report the next day.
The Columbus committee holds
hearings at which both candidates
are invited to appear. At the hearing,
the committee has clips of the
offending ads available for viewing.
The committee deliberates after the
hearing and decides whether to issue
a public finding. Columbus is unique
in this approach; all other committees said they meet and decide based
on the parties' submissions and the
investigation, if any.
11) Committee action.

Committees are most likely to take
action when there is a material factual misrepresentation-it doesn't
seem to matter whether the misrepresentation is about the opponent
or the candidate. The unofficial
committees purport to be willing to
act to condemn ads that vilify an
opponent without being factually
inaccurate (a Willie Horton ad), but
the committees did not indicate they
had so acted. Committees also purport to be willing to condemn campaign quasi-promises (i.e. running
as a "pro-life" candidate) but, except
for Kentucky, no responding committee indicated it had done so.
12) Remedies.

All committees reported that they
asked the offending candidate to
make amends-by correcting or discontinuing advertisements, and, if
necessary, disavowing advertisements. Committees also reported
sending letters to candidates that
could be publicized. Several committees
(Kentucky,
Illinois)
reported issuing press releases "as a
last resort." The Kentucky commit-

tee issued strongly worded press
releases condemning unfair 11th
hour television ads by two candidates (both lost). In addition, some
committees state they would report
egregious conduct to the disciplinary authority, and one committee
(Maryland) reported that it had
done so.
13) The rapid response/llth hour
complaint problem.

Most respondents recognize the
need to have a process in place to
deal expeditiously with complaints
received in the last days of a campaign. One committee reported that,
without a rapid response plan, it was
unable to deal with a serious complaint before the election. As noted,
Columbus, Ohio, requires committee members to be available every
morning of the last week before the
election. Candidates are aware that
the committee is able to and will act
expeditiously on complaints..
14) Committee impact on judicial
campaigning.

Without exception, active committees believe that oversight committees positively influence judicial
campaign behavior. For example,
the Dade County, Florida, committee responded that it has deterred
inappropriate campaigning and its
members believe it is an extremely
worthwhile activity. There is an
incentive to sign the campaign
agreement and reap the favorable
publicity that signing brings. The
agreement establishes normative
conduct and imposes restraint; and
the committee is the cop on the cor-

ner that deters candidates from
doing what they might otherwise do
to win.
Recommendations
1. Committee rules and procedures
should be readily available.
The committee's membership,
rules, procedures, and complaint
form should be available on its website, or linked to a bar website. Committees should refer to the website on
all correspondence and literature.
2. Committees should communicate with candidates.
Committees should send all candiwww.ajs.org JUDICATURE
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dates a copy of rules, procedures,
and the complaint form as soon as
the filing deadline passes. During
the election cycle, they should communicate with candidates on other
matters, for example to commend
candidates who sign the fair campaign agreement, and to warn candidates of the danger in responding to
special interest group questionnaires.
3. Committees should ask candidates to sign an agreement to campaign fairly.
Committees should ask all candidates to sign an affirmation (or agreeinent) to campaign in a way that
reflects the dignity and integrity of
judicial office and the independence
of the judiciary. The 2006 Alabama
campaign agreement is typical.
The actions of candidates for judicial
office affect the integrity and independence of our judicial system,
reflecting on both the Alabamajudicial
system and the State of Alabama.
Therefore, it is important that judicial
election campaigns be conducted in
such a way that enhances the candidate's reputation, brings credit to the
individual, and reflects the dignity and
integrity of judicial office and the independence of the judiciary.
Canon 7, Alabama Code of judicial
Conduct sets minimum standards for

campaigns, but the Committee believes
judicial candidates should aspire to a
level of campaign conduct that reflects
their respect for the dignity and
integrity ofjudicial office and the independence of thejudiciy.
In keeping with these principles and
objectives and in order to promote
public confidence in both attorneys
and judges, I hereby agree to conduct
my campaign in accordance with the
Alabama Code of Judicial Conduct. I
further agree to disavow advertisements that use false or misleading
information and/or accusations to
impugn the integrity of the judicial system, the integrity of a candidate, or
erode public trust and confidence in

the independence and impartiality of
the judiciary.

Other examples of campaign
agreements are available from the
National Ad Hoc Advisory Committee
on Judicial Campaign Oversight.'
Committees should list on their
websites, or otherwise publicize, the
names of candidates signing the
236

agreement. Signing candidates reap
favorable publicity; those who don't
sign might be penalized by the voters.
For example, in 2006, the incumbent
chiefjustice of the Alabama Supreme
Court refused to sign the agreement.
The challenger did sign and called on
the chief to campaign fairly and ethically. The committee issued a press
release stating in part that
The agreement asks that the candidate conduct his or her campaign in a
manner that reflects the integrity and
dignity ofjudicial officer... The Committee continues to encourage all candidates who have not previously signed
to do so. In so doing, they affirm to the
citizens of Alabama that they will conduct their campaigns in a manner
befitting the judiciary and the office
they seek.

The incumbent, who refused to sign
the agreement, was unseated by his
challenger."
An agreement encourages candidates to campaign ethically and provides a reason for committee action
against candidates who violate their
agreements. The Kentucky Judicial
Campaign
Conduct Committee
(KJCCC) issued a press release on
October 11, 2006, criticizing the conduct of supreme court candidate
Rick Johnson, who had signed the
campaign agreement. "We think
JudgeJohnson's view ofjudicial campaigning is off the mark, and not in
keeping with the campaign agreement that we offered to candidates
this summer-an agreement he
signed." Johnson lost the election."
4. Committees should process
complaints promptly.
Committees should have an intake
process to enable the committee to
respond quickly to a complaint,
preferably within 24 hours. There
must be an intake person or persons
to whom complaints are directed. If
feasible, the complaint should be
completed on line with automatic
posting to the person or persons
charged with intake responsibility.
The complaint should be in writing
with some form of verification.
5. Committees should authorize a
person to dismiss non-meritorious
complaints.
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Committees should designate a
person who can dismiss non-meritorious complaints without further
inquiry. In Louisiana, for example,
the chair of the committee is empowered to dismiss summarily complaints that do not allege facts that
would constitute a violation of any
canon that falls within the Committee's oversightjurisdiction.l In Maryland, the co-chairs have authority to
dismiss complaints after "conferring
with committee members as necessary to determine whether there is a
basis for further inquiry.""
6. Committees should decide
their jurisdiction in advance of the
campaign.
Before the campaign begins, committees should decide the races (and
types of campaigning) in which they
will entertain complaints. The committee responses to the survey reveal a
great deal of variation on this issue.
Local committees (Dade County,
Florida, for example) consider only
local races. While most reporting committees do not restrict the kinds of
complaints within their jurisdiction,
some consider only complaints about
campaign advertising. An example is
the Illinois State Committee, which
exercises jurisdiction only over campaign advertising in supreme court
and appellate court races. Similarly,
the Columbus (Ohio) Bar Association
committee exercises jurisdiction only
over campaign advertising in local
races; the committee screens ads for
candidates who agree to pre-publication screening, and hears complaints

against ads alleged to be unfair.
7. Committees should decide how
and whether to investigate complaints.
Prior to campaigning, committees
should decide whether and how they
will investigate complaints and
15. ssww.judicialcampaignconduct.org
16. Judicial Campaign Oversight Digest,
National Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on judicial
Campaign Oversight, july, 2007, pp. 1-2.
17. Al Cross and William H. Fortune, KentuciY
2006JudicialElections, 55 Dauvtc L. REv. 637, 647

(2007).
18. Report of the Louisiana Judicial Oversight
Committee, Fall 2006 (document on file with the
authors).
19. Sally Rankin, Court Information Officer,
Marland Judicial Campaign Conduc Committee, email Noxvember 14, 2007 (document on file
with the authors).

resolve disputes about the facts. Most
of the committees report that they
attempt to investigate, usually by
assigning the task to committee
members.2' However, a committee

with limited resources might reasonably conclude that unless the issues
can be decided on the basis of the
complaint and the response (and the
offending advertisement, if that is
the basis of the complaint) that the
2
committee will decline to act. '

8. Committees should determine
in advance how decisions are to be
made.
Committees should decide what
constitutes a quorum, when and
where meetings are to be held, and
whether members can be present by
telephone conference call (and how
to set such calls up). If it is impractical
for the full committee to meet, the
committee should authorize a subcommittee to act (with a report to the
full

committee) .2

9. Committees should have in
place procedures for handling l1th
hour complaints.
It is essential that committees have
a procedure for acting and responding quickly. The Columbus Bar Association requires committee members
to be available for a meeting at a set
time every day for the 10 days preceding the election. It is strongly recommended that committees emulate
the Columbus approach-having the
decision makers (whether the full
committee or a subcommittee) available to meet in person or by tele-

20. E.g.,
Kentucky and Maryland.
21. E.g.,
Nevada and Dade County, Florida.
22. E.g., Kentucky Judicial Campaign Conduct
Committee procedures (on file with the authors).
23. The Alabama Campaign Conduct Committee agreement.
24. F.g, The Kentucky commnittee's October 11,
2006 press release condemning supreme court
candidate RickJohnson's public statements about
abortion, gay marriage, and prayer in schools.
Cross and Fortune, sulpra
n. 17, at 647.
25. One example is the attack on an Alabama
Supreme Court justice who followed a binding
decision of the United States Supreme Court and
voted to set aside the death penalty for a man who
committed murder while a juvenile.
26. The Maryland committee acted in several
cases in which the candidate's literature allegedly
suggested the candidate was already a judge.
While stopping short of issuing a press release,
the Kentucky committee condemned by letter a
judge -who campaigtted as 'judge of dtc year,"
without making it clear that the honor had been
bestowed fiveyears earliei.

phone conference call at set times in
the days immediately preceding the
election. Trying to resolve matters by
email or exchanged phone messages
is not satisfactory.
10. Committees should attempt to
reach a consensus on what is fair and
what is unfair.
Committees should attempt to
decide, in advance, what constitutes
"false or misleading information
and/or accusations that impugn the
integrity of the judicial system, the
integrity of a candidate, or erode public trust and confidence in the independence and impartiality of the
judiciary."2' Specifically, committees
should consider whether an advertisement that suggests, but does not
promise, that the candidate is committed to an interest group's position,
"erodes public trust and confidence in
the independence and impartiality of
the judiciary. ' '2

Committees should

also consider whether a stronglyworded attack ad, for which there is some

basis, "impugns the integrity of a candidate," and whether a truthful statement about a judge's decision
"impugn(s) the integrity of the judicial system" if the statement preys on
the public's ignorance of the law.'
Committees should decide what they
will do if candidates exaggerate or distort their qualifications for judicial

Conclusion
Unfair and undignified advertising
causes the public to believe that
judges are no different than other
politicians. Campaign statements
that commit or appear to commit a
candidate to rule in a particular way
undermine the democratic promise
of an independent judiciary. Other
than the candidates' self restraint,
judicial campaign oversight committees serve as the only barrier-and
that a flimsy barrier-against the
"Barbarians at the Gate"-the forces
that seek to undermine the tradition
of dignified elections and an independent judiciary not committed to
campaign promises and special interests. Communities and states facing
judicial elections without effective
committees would do well to draw on
the experiences of the committees
summarized in this article and the
recommendations that follow. The
importance of creating new judicial
campaign oversight committees and
maintaining existing ones could not
be more paramount. %
Editor'snote: Formore inormation about
judicial campaign oversight committees,
visit www.judicialcampaignconduct.org.

2

office. '

11. Committees should decide
what they will do to stop or remedy
unfair campaigning.
Committees benefit from having a
graduated scale of responses to
unfair campaigning. The following
"graduated scale" is drawn from the
responses to the survey: first, a committee should ask the offending candidate to make amends-which
might mean stopping or changing
an ad or disavowing ads that have
been run. If the candidate refuses to
take remedial action, or if remedial
action would be ineffective, the committee might issue a letter that can
be publicized by the offended candidate. In extreme cases, the committee should consider issuing a press
release condemning the offensive
campaign tactics.
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